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The paper shows that there is a close connection between (con-
stant) consistent conjectures in a given game and evolutionary stabil-
ity of conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent and
consistent conjectures are the only interior candidates for evolutionary
stability.
Keywords: consistent conjectures, evolutionarily stable strategy,
indirect evolution
JEL Codes: C72, D43, L13
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recently, in the context of a particular linear-quadratic duopoly model,
M u l l e ra n dN o r m a n n( 2 0 0 3 )s h o w e dt h a tc o n s i s t e n tc o n j e c t u r e sa r ee v o l u -
tionarily stable, while Dixon and Somma (2003) demonstrated that an ex-
plicit evolutionary process converges to consistent conjectures. The purpose
of this note is to show that (constant) consistent conjectures and evolutionary
stability are closely connected in a general setting of two-player games.
∗I thank Daniel Seidmann, Kala Krishna and Bouwe Dijkstra for useful suggestions.
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2.1 The Game
Consider a two-player game G =( {1,2},{X1,X 2},{u1,u 2}), where X1,X 2 ⊂
R are convex strategy spaces and u1,u 2 are payoﬀ functions of the two players.
In what follows, i refers to either Player 1 or Player 2, and j to the other
player (j 6= i). The payoﬀ functions are assumed to be twice continuously
diﬀerentiable.
The players have (constant) conjectures about the marginal reaction of
the opponent to a marginal change in strategy. Let rij ∈ Yi ⊂ R,w h e r eYi
is a convex set, be this conjecture of Player i about Player j,t h a ti s ,P l a y e r
i believes that
dxj
dxi(xi,x j)=rij ∀xi,x j. I work with constant conjectures be-
cause they allow some selection; if conjectures depend on xi,x j many strategy
proﬁles can be supported by (weakly) consistent conjectures (Laitner, 1980;
Boyer and Moreaux, 1983).
Since Player i believes that xj depends on xi,P l a y e ri’s maximization
problem is maxXi ui(xi,x j(xi)). At an interior solution x∗






dxi = 0. Since the player does not attempt to
conjecture the whole reaction function xj(xi), but only its slope
dxj
dxi = rij, xj





∂xj(xi,x j)rij = 0. It follows
that for given xj and corresponding x∗





∂xj(xi,x j) 6=0a tx∗
i.
Claim 1 For given rij and xj, at an interior best response x∗
i of Player i it
holds that −
∂ui/∂xi(xi,xj)
∂ui/∂xj(xi,xj) = rij,w h e n
∂ui
∂xj(x∗
i,x j) 6=0 .
Condition 1
∂ui






∂xj(xi,x j)rij. At an interior solution x∗
i of
Player i’s maximization problem Fi(xi,x j;rij) = 0. If the solution is unique
and interior for each xj, Fi(xi,x j;rij) = 0 implicitly deﬁnes the reaction
function x∗
i(xj;rij)o fP l a y e ri. To be able to use this reaction function I
require
Condition 2 For all rij ∈ Y, all xj ∈ Xj, problem maxXi ui(xi,x j(xi)) has
unique interior solution x∗
i.
22.2 Consistent Conjectures
To distinguish the consistency notion I use from that in (some of) the liter-
ature (e.g. Bresnahan, 1981, where consistent conjectures are functions and
are required to coincide with all derivatives of the actual reaction function
in the neighborhood of equilibrium) I call a conjecture of Player i weakly
consistent if the conjectured reaction of Player j equals the actual slope of





Since the reaction function is determined implicitly by Fi(xi,x j;rij)=0 ,





∂Fi/∂xi(xi,xj),w h e n
∂Fi
∂xi(xi,x j) 6=0 . T h e r e f o r e ,a
conjecture rC
ij of Player i is weakly consistent when at the best response
x∗
i(rC


















j is the interior best response of Player j when Player j’s conjecture
is rji and Player i’s strategy is x∗
i.
Claim 2 For given rij,r ji,a tb e s tr e s p o n s e s(x∗
i,x ∗
j),c o n j e c t u r erij is weakly















j) 6=0for any rij ∈ Yi,r ji ∈ Yj.
Conjectures rC
ij,r C












ij). When the game is symmetric, the reaction functions are sym-
metric. Then a symmetric conjecture rC = rC
ij = rC






2.3 Evolutionary Stability of Conjectures
Suppose that conjectures is something a player is born with (one can inter-
pret them as optimism/pessimism attitudes). Consider a large population
of players who are repeatedly randomly matched. In a match, players ob-
serve the conjectures of each other and behave according to equilibrium of
the game with these conjectures. The (evolutionary) success of a given con-
jecture is determined by averaging of equilibrium payoﬀs of players with this
conjecture over all matches. The proportions of players with given conjecture
change according to their evolutionary success.
3For given conjecture rji of Player j, evolutionarily stable (ES) conjecture
of Player i is such conjecture rES
ij that no other conjecture rij perform bet-
ter or equally well in a population of Players i almost exclusively composed
of players with conjecture rES
ij (and the rest of the population have conjec-
ture rij). If in a monomorphic population of players with conjecture rES
ij a
small proportion of mutants with some other conjecture rij appears, evolu-
tionary forces will eliminate the mutants. This approach is a generalization
to asymmetric games of the indirect evolution approach of Guth and Yaari
(1992).
Given conjectures rij,r ji,l e tui(rij,r ji)=ui(x∗
i(rij,r ji),x ∗
j(rij,r ji)) be
the payoﬀ of Player i when equilibrium x∗
i(rij,r ji),x ∗
j(rij,r ji)i sp l a y e d .F o r
given conjecture r∗
ji of Player j, conjecture rES
ij of Player i is evolutionarily
stable if ui(rES
ij ,r ∗
ji) >u i(rij,r ∗
ji)f o ra n yrij 6= r∗
ij (asymmetric games ESS,
Selten, 1980). A conjecture of Player i is evolutionarily stable against a given
conjecture of Player j if it is unique best response to that conjecture of Player
j in the game with payoﬀs ui(rij,r ji).
Given conjectures rij,r ji of the players, if the solutions of optimization




ui(xi,x j)( 2 )
s.t. Fi(xi,x j;rij)=0
Fj(xi,x j;rji)=0
By the implicit function theorem, the system of equations Fi(xi,x j;rij)=










∂xi 6=0a trij,r ji,x ∗
i(rij,r ji),x ∗
j(rij,r ji). Substituting the implicit func-








Problem (3) is exactly the problem to ﬁnd a best response conjecture for
Player i, given conjecture rji of Player j.
S i n c ep r o b l e m s( 2 )a n d( 3 )a r ee q u i v a l e n t ,t h e yh a v et h es a m es o l u t i o n .




























=0 ( 4 c )
where λ,µare Lagrangean multipliers. Since ui does not depend directly on
rij,
∂ui
∂rij =0 .S i n c eFj does not depend directly on rij,
∂Fj









∂xj. By Condition 1
∂ui
∂xj 6=0 ,t h u s
∂Fi
∂rij 6=0 .







∂xj 6= 0 by Condition 3).
Claim 3 At an interior solution of maxrij ui(x∗
i(rij,r ji),x ∗














∂xi 6=0at rij,r ji,x ∗
i(rij,r ji),x ∗
j(rij,r ji) for all
rij ∈ Yi,r ji ∈ Yj.
By Claim 1 rij = −
∂ui/∂xi
∂ui/∂xj. Combining with Claim 3, if interior conjecture
rij is evolutionarily stable, then rij = −
∂Fj/∂xj
∂Fj/∂xi. But by Claim 2 this means
that rij is weakly consistent. We have
Proposition 1 Suppose Conditions 1 to 4 are satisﬁed. If interior conjec-
ture rij is evolutionarily stable against given rji, then it is weakly consistent
for this rji.
A partial reverse of the proposition may be stated as following:
Proposition 2 Suppose Conditions 1 to 4 are satisﬁed. If interior conjec-
ture rij is not consistent for given rji, then it is not evolutionarily stable
against rji.
Additional conditions are needed for the full reverse. Condition 4 guar-
antees existence of equilibrium functions x∗
i(rij,r ji),x ∗
j(rij,r ji). If suﬃcient
conditions for global unique optimum of problem (3) are satisﬁed, then weak
consistency of interior conjecture r∗
ij implies that r∗
ij is an ES conjecture. One
such suﬃcient condition is global concavity of the payoﬀ function.
5Proposition 3 Suppose Conditions 1 to 4 are satisﬁed. If interior r∗
ij is
weakly consistent for given rji and [ui(x∗
i(r,rji),x ∗
j(r,rji)]00
r < 0 for all r,t h e n
r∗
ij is evolutionarily stable against rji.
Another condition, often easier to check, is local concavity together with
the uniqueness of the critical point. Thus











ij < 0,t h e nr∗
ij is evolutionarily stable.
The analysis above is for Player i and for given conjecture rji of Player j.
Analogous analysis can be performed for Player j, keeping constant conjec-
ture rij of Player i. If interior conjectures r∗
ij,r ∗
ji are mutually evolutionarily
stable, then they are mutually consistent. If interior conjectures are not
mutually consistent, then they are not mutually evolutionarily stable. Anal-
ogous extensions hold for the other propositions.
When the game is symmetric, it is natural to expect players to hold sym-
metric conjectures. Although in the symmetric case evolutionary stability is
not equivalent to strict best response, the propositions hold for the symmetric
case as well. An interior evolutionarily stable conjecture is a best response to
itself, so ﬁrst order conditions have to hold, thus implying Propositions 1 and
2. Since a strict symmetric equilibrium is evolutionarily stable in the sym-
metric case, suﬃcient conditions of Propositions 3 and 4 imply evolutionary
stability in this case too.
The graphical illustration of the close connection between consistency and
evolutionary stability is given in the example in the next section. Intuitively,
rji determines the reaction function of Player j.B yv a r y i n grij,P l a y e ri can
change his own reaction function and so can change its point of intersection
with the reaction function of Player j.P l a y e ri will choose such a point on
the reaction function of Player j where it is tangent to level curves of Player
i’s payoﬀ function. But since rij by Claim 1 equals the slope of these level
curves, best response rij has to be equal to the slope of the reaction function
of Player j.
If conjecture rij is consistent, Player i ”knows” the reaction of Player
j to small changes in xi. Thus a player with consistent conjecture maxi-
mizes the ”correct” function ui(xi,x j(xi)), and so has higher payoﬀ than if
conjecture is not consistent. Therefore the obtained result may look obvi-
ous. Nevertheless, Muller and Normann (2003) state ”the result that the
evolutionarily stable conjectures coincide with the consistent conjectures is
surprising as there is no obvious analogy between the two”, and the result
6was certainly also surprising for me. There was no reason to expect apriori
that ’more rationality’ (consistency) should lead to the same result as ’less
rationality’ (evolution); only after interpreting the result did the connection
appear obvious.
3E x a m p l e s
3.1 Linear-Quadratic Cournot Duopoly
Constant conjectures are justiﬁed when the reaction functions are indeed
linear. This is the case, for example, when in a duopoly the demand function
is linear and cost functions are quadratic. This is the case considered in
Muller and Normann (2003) and Dixon and Somma (2003).
Consider a symmetric Cournot duopoly with inverse demand function
P(qi,q j)=a − b(qi + qj),a>0,b>0a n dc o s tf u n c t i o nc(qi)=c
2q2
i,c>0.
The strategy space is X =[ 0 , b
a). Let the conjecture space be Y =( −1,1).





∂qj = −bqi 6= 0 in the interior of X, Condition 1 is satisﬁed. Player




dqi = rij.T h eﬁrst order




which is interior. Since the second order condition −2b(1 + rij) − c<0i s
satisﬁed for all qi, Condition 2 is satisﬁed. Thus the reaction function is given
by Fi =0 .
Since
∂Fi








∂qi =( −2b − c − brij)(−2b − c − brji) − b2 6=0w h e nrij,r ji ∈
(−1,1), Condition 4 is also satisﬁed.






Then r = − b
2b+c+br,o rbr2+(2b+c)r+b =0 .L e tH(r)=br2+(2b+c)r+b.
Since H(−1) = −c<0,H(0) = b>0, and H(1) = 4b + c>0, there is one
root on (−1,1) and it is between −1 and 0. Thus there is unique consistent
conjecture rC ∈ (−1,0). By Proposition 2 it is the unique interior candidate
for an evolutionarily stable conjecture.








From the reaction functions (a − b(q∗
i + q∗
j)) − (b + brij)q∗
i − cq∗
i =0 ,o r
(a − b(q∗
i + q∗
j)) = (b + brij + c)q∗
















∂rij (2b(1 + rij)+c).
The equilibrium for given rij,r ji is q∗
i =
a(b+c+brji)




reaction function of Player 2
reaction functions of Player 1
level curves for profit of Player 1


















∂rij =0i srij = − b
2b+c+brji.












2((2b + c + brji)(−(2b +





ij is determined by the sign of (2b+c+
brji)(−(2b + c)+2 brij)+4 b2.W h e nrij = rji = rC, this expression becomes
− b




rC < 0. By Proposition
4
Proposition 5 In the linear-quadratic Cournot duopoly there exist unique
consistent conjecture and it is unique evolutionarily stable one.
To get the intuition behind the result, also for the general case of the
previous section, it is useful to consider a diagram. Conjecture r21 determines
a reaction function of Player 2, which is linear in this case. Varying r12 varies
reaction functions of Player 1, three of which are drawn on Figure 1. The
equilibrium is on the intersection of the reaction functions, thus varying r12
allows Player 1 to move along the given reaction function of Player 2. Some
level curves of Player 1 for the linear-quadratic duopoly are also drawn in
the ﬁgure. Proﬁt is increasing in the south-east direction.
Since Player 1 can vary the equilibrium point by moving along the reaction
function of Player 2, the best proﬁtP l a y e r1c a na c h i e v ei sa tt h ep o i n tw h e r e
a level curve is tangent to the reaction function of Player 2. At this point
8the slope of the reaction function −
∂F2/∂q1
∂F2/∂q2 equals the slope of the proﬁtl e v e l
curve −
∂π1/∂q1
∂π1/∂q2. For Player 1, having a conjecture r12 means that the reaction
function of Player 1 cuts proﬁt level curves at points where its slope equals
r12 (by Claim 1). Therefore, conjecture r12 equals the slope of the proﬁtl e v e l
curves, which at the tangency point equals the slope of the reaction function
of Player 2, which means that r12 is consistent.
3.2 Diﬀerentiated Goods Bertrand Duopoly
Consider a symmetric diﬀerentiated goods Bertrand duopoly where the de-
mand of Firm i is given by Di(pi,p j)=A−pi+kpj,w i t hA>0a n dk ∈ (0,1).
Firms choose prices from the strategy set X =[ 0 ,∞). Suppose that costs are
zero. The proﬁto fF i r mi is πi(pi,p j)=pi(A − pi + kpj). Let Y =( −1,1).
Since
∂πi
∂pj = kpi 6= 0 in the interior of X, Condition 1 is satisﬁed. Given
conjecture rij,P l a y e ri’s problem is maxpi pi(A−pi +kpj(pi)), and
dpj
dpi = rij.




2−krij > 0. Since the second order condition 2(krij − 1) < 0i ss a t i s ﬁed
for all pi, Condition 2 is satisﬁed. Therefore the reaction function of Player
i is given by Fi =0 .
Condition 3 is satisﬁed since
∂Fi








∂pi =( 2− krij)(2− krji) − k2 6=0w h e nrij,r ji ∈ (−1,1), Condition 4 is
satisﬁed too.





∂Fi/∂pi.T h e n
r = k




of which only the root rC = 1−
√
1−k2
k > 0 is between −1a n d1 .T h e r ei su n i q u e
consistent conjecture rC ∈ (0,1). It is unique candidate for an evolutionarily
stable conjecture by Proposition 2.
The equilibrium for given rij,r ji is p∗
i =
A(2−krji+k)








































(2−krij)(2−krji)−k2.T h eﬁrst order condition k−rij(2−krji)=
0 has unique solution rij = k
2−krji for any rji.












rij(2 − krji)) − (2 − krij)(2− krji)+k2). At rij = rji = rC 3k(k − rij(2 −
krji)) −(2 − krij)(2− krji)+k2 = k2(1 − 1
rC) < 0, therefore by Proposition
4
9Proposition 6 There exist unique consistent conjecture in the linear diﬀer-
entiated goods Bertrand duopoly of this section and it is the unique evolu-
tionarily stable conjecture.
3.3 Semi-Public Good Games
Consider the following symmetric two player public good provision game.
Players have endowments of private good w. They can contribute xi to
t h ep u b l i cg o o d ,a n dl e a v eyi = w − xi of private good for consumption.
Let the strategy set be X =[ −w,w], which is needed to guarantee interior
best response and can be interpreted as players having the opportunity to
contribute as well as to take out of a common pool of public good. The
contribution of Player j enters Player i’s utility with weight 0 < β < 1, thus
for Player i the total supply of public good is Xi = xi +βxj. Players’ utility
functions are ui(yi,X i). This is the model of semi-public goods considered
in Costrell (1991). Let Y =( −1,1).
Suppose that the utility functions are ui(yi,X i)=yα
i X
1−α
i ,w h e r e0<
α < 1. The payoﬀ function of Player i is then ui(xi,x j)=( w − xi)α(xi +
βxj)1−α. Given conjecture rij,t h eﬁrst order condition of the maximization










(1 + βrij)=0 . L e tv =
Xi
yi .T h e n −αv1−α +( 1− α)v−α(1 + βrij)=0⇒ v−α(−αv +( 1− α)(1 +
βrij)) = 0 ⇒ v = 1−α
α (1 + βrij). This implies that
xi+βxj
w−xi = 1−α
α (1 + βrij),
or xi + βxj = 1−α

























< 0 are satisﬁed,
reaction functions are given by Fi = 0, and Condition 2 is fulﬁlled.





1+(1−α)βrij.W i t h a c o n s i s t e n t s y m -
metric conjecture r = −
βα
1+(1−α)βr ⇒ (1 − α)βr2 + r + αβ =0 . L e tG(r)=
(1 − α)βr2 + r + αβ.S i n c eG(−1) = β − 1 < 0a n dG(0) = αβ > 0, there is
an r between −1a n d0s ot h a tG(r)=0 .S u c hr is consistent, and let it be
denoted by rC.F r o mrC = −
∂Fi/∂xj
∂Fi/∂xi it follows that rC = −β
yi
Xi+yi.




and analogous expression for x∗
j. Though it is possible that x∗
i < 0, it holds
that y∗
i = w − x∗











6= 0 in the interior, as required by Con-
dition 1. Also
∂Fi

































[XiXj + Xiyj + yiXj +( 1−
β
2)yiyj] 6= 0, satisfying Condition 4. By Proposition 2 the consistent conjec-
ture is the unique interior candidate for an evolutionary stable conjecture.
Since in equilibrium X∗
i = 1−α
α (1 + βrij)y∗
i, the utility function can






¢1−α (1 + βrij)1−αy∗












































∂rij = 0 has unique solution rij = −
αβ
1+(1−α)βrji = rC ∈
(−1,0) when rji = rC.




¢1−α (1 − α)β















(1+(1−α)βrij)(1+(1−α)βrji)−α2β2]. At rij = rji = rC the ﬁrst term in






at rij = rji = rC, the sign of the second term is determined by the signs of
1+( 1−α)βrC and (1 +(1 −α)βrC)2 −α2β
2.S i n c e1 + ( 1 −α)βrC = −
βα
rC,
1+( 1− α)βrC > 0a n d( 1+( 1− α)βrC)2 − α2β
2 = α2β
2( 1






ij < 0, and the consistent conjecture rC is also evolution-
arily stable.
Proposition 7 In the semi-public good game of this section the unique con-
sistent conjecture rC is unique evolutionarily stable conjecture.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The observations of Muller and Normann (2003) and Dixon and Somma
(2003) about evolutionary stability of consistent conjectures for a particular
duopoly case generalize to other games because they are based on coinci-
dence of ﬁrst order conditions. Apart from the examples considered in the
paper, other games to which the results can be applied include common pool
resource exploitation games and rent-seeking games. Furthermore, it should
be possible to generalize the results to n-player aggregative games, i.e. games
in which payoﬀs depend on own strategy and on an aggregate of strategies
11of other players, treating the conjecture as conjecture about the aggregate
reaction of other players.
The intuition for evolutionary stability of consistent conjecture is that
a player with such conjecture correctly estimates the response of the other
player and thus maximizes the ”right” function, outperforming in evolution-
ary terms players with other conjectures. Though this result may appear
obvious, it certainly was not before the analysis. It is interesting that ’ra-
tional’ approach (consistency) and ’evolutionary’ approach lead to the same
outcome in many games. Evolutionary approach can provide a justiﬁcation
for consistent conjectures as emerging from a dynamic process. Consistent
conjecture, on the other hand, is often easier to ﬁnd, simplifying evolution-
ary analysis. Depending on the questions asked about a game, the two
approaches complement each other.
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